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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TESCO AMERICAN, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. LETHER d/b/a 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
MATEMEf* JURISDICTION 
Utah R. App. P. 3, 4 confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this ape ~ ~' 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the parties effect an accord and satisfaction'' 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In i nnsidpfinci IN ,ip|if-vil limn "iiimniniy Iiidgment, the Court construes all facts 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
Appeal No 930762-CA 
I I I I ' , 
party, and reviews independently issues of law. Baumgart v. Utah Farm ft, 851 P.2d 647 
(Utah 1993); Hill v. Seattle First Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246, (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute for this appeal is UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607, which 
provides: 
The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in 
full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the 
negotiation of an instrument accompanied by a statement containing such 
words or words of similar meaning, does not establish an accord and 
satisfaction which binds the payee or prevents the collection of any 
remaining amount owed upon the underlying obligation, unless the payee 
personally, or by an officer or employee with actual authority to settle 
claims, agrees in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as 
full payment of the obligation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Richard T. Lether, dba Utah Machine Tool Exchange (Utah Machine), purchased 
certain equipment from Calissi Properties, Inc. (Calissi), located in the State of Florida, 
for resale to the Plaintiff, Tesco American, Inc. (Tesco). Tesco paid $15,000 for the 
equipment to Utah Machine and Utah Machine immediately used those funds to pay 
Calissi. 
Calissi failed to deliver the equipment to Utah Machine as agreed and Utah 
Machine was unable to deliver the equipment to Tesco as promised. 
Utah Machine made vigorous efforts to compel Calissi to perform, but was 
unsuccessful. 
Tesco instructed its attorneys to send a written demand to Utah Machine to refund 
the purchase price of $15,000. 
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i t?oco sued Utah Machine for breach of contract and nondelivery of the equipment 
before the $15,000 had been refunded and before Calissi had delivered the equipment. 
i n proximately thirty ckw 's affpr PI lit was filed, Calissi shipped the equipment to Utah 
Machine, and within a few days thereafter, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-Judgment 
ion. 
On or about November 2A &** Mie Court entered an Order dissolving the Pre-
judgment Writ of Replevin ana o, J<. .. 
At the hearing, the Cou, i.- nested that the parties work the matter out and in that spirit, 
1 ,A
~h Machine stated in open Cou^ +Uo+ ;+ ^ ' i l d be willing to refi JI id It le $ 15,000 
•^•^p»y. TPSPO'S f .ouirvl riqr • -" - • *^  $15,000 and the check was delivered 
to its counsel's office . ^ v f M-^e -av-VT--* : i full repay on number 6046 per 
having deposited the c . esco filed an £r.w-^.ded Complair ..-use or 
Action foiExemplary and : . .. . .. . . .geswas 
Utah Machine's I W L U M \O\ Summary Judgmo..; ...wL. W. March 16, . ~~~, ..^s 
granted by the District Court, on June 25, 1993, and Judgment was entered on i.«iw 11 
: dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties 
" September - , Mea us Noiice of Appeal on October 5, 1993, and the 
,]
 i|in| MI'- in NIT 'nmh nr /(> 1093. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The U u . 1 I 'M.MI 'I L "' J i b i n g L-J'L , ' I- , ..Jisf.i.hJil > > MIL, ease: 
1. On May 27, 1992, Utah Machine purchased certain equipment from Calissi 
- n -
for resale to Tesco. (R. 00178) 
2. On May 27, 1992, Utah Machine sold the equipment to Tesco for $15,000. 
(R. 00178) 
3. Tesco paid Utah Machine $15,000 for the equipment with its check number 
011338, dated May 27, 1992. (R. 00178) 
4. Utah Machine paid Calissi $12,750 for the equipment with its check number 
9533, dated May 27, 1992. (R. 00178) 
5. Utah Machine purchased the equipment from Calissi with the understanding 
it would be shipped upon receipt of payment in full. (R. 00178) 
6. Calissi failed to perform as agreed in that it did not ship the equipment upon 
receipt of payment in full from Utah Machine. (R. 00178) 
7. Utah Machine, through counsel and the Economic Crime Unit of the Attorney 
General's Office of the State of Florida, pressed Calissi to perform without success. (R. 
00178) 
8. On August 21, 1992, James R. Kruse of the law firm of Kruse, Landa and 
Maycock demanded of Utah Machine formally to repay the amount of $15,000 to Tesco, 
plus interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from May 27, 1992, to the date 
of the payment, together with $200 in attorney's fees, and for costs incurred in connection 
with asserting the demand. (R. 00179) 
9. James R. Kruse sent another communication to Utah Machine on August 
24, 1992, reiterating Tesco's demand to refund the $15,000 plus interest, attorney's fees 
and reimbursement of $622 in air fare for the representative of Tesco to travel to Florida 
- 4 -
to inspect the machine that Utah Machine had agreed to sell to Tesco. (R. 00179) 
10. On September 11, 1992, Utah Machine's attorney, Irene Warr, wrote to 
Ellen Maycock suggesting a method by which the $15,000 could be refunded if Utah 
Machine could not secure the machine from Calissi. (R. 00179) 
11. On September 16, 1992, Tesco's attorney, Ellen Maycock, wrote to Utah 
Machine's attorney, Irene Warr, outlining a method by which Utah Machine could refund 
the $15,000, plus interest, attorney's fees, costs and air fare incurred by Tesco to inspect 
the machine. (R. 00179) 
12. On or about September 15, 1992, Tesco filed suit against Utah Machine. 
(R. 00179) 
13. On or about October 15, 1992, Ray Ciarci of Calissi advised Utah Machine 
that the equipment was available and Utah Machine arranged for the machine to be 
shipped to Salt Lake City. (R. 00179) 
14. On or about October 27, 1992, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-judgment 
Writ of Replevin and took the equipment into its possession. (R. 00180) 
15. On or about November 24, 1992, the Court entered an Order requiring 
Tesco to return the equipment to Utah Machine. (R. 00180) 
16. At the hearing on Tesco's Order to Show Cause why its Order for Pre-
judgment Writ of Replevin should not be continued in effect during the pendency of the 
action, Utah Machine stated in open court that he would be willing to refund the $15,000 
immediately. (R. 00180) 
17. Tesco, through its counsel, Ellen Maycock, instructed Utah Machine to 
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deliver the $15,000 check to her office. (R. 00180) 
18. Utah Machine paid the $15,000 with its check number 9825, dated October 
30, 1992. (R. 00180) 
19. Utah Machine wrote "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court." (R. 
00180) 
20. Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, endorsed the check and deposited 
it. (R. 00180) 
21. After having deposited the check with the restrictive endorsement, Tesco 
continued with its lawsuit and filed its First Amended Complaint seeking an award of 
compensatory damages of $15,000, for an award of incidental and consequential 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial, its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the 
prosecution of the action, and for an award of exemplary and punitive damages in an 
amount to be determined at trial. (R. 00181) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction as enunciated by the Appellate Courts in 
this jurisdiction has not been overturned by the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-
607 as Tesco has argued. It is consistent with the decisions to-date. It may have been 
implicit in the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, but the statute now makes it clear 
that only an officer or employee with authority to settle claims may agree in writing 
(endorse a check with restrictive language) to accept the amount stated in the instrument 
as full payment of the obligation. 
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It is well established that general principles of contract law govern accord and 
satisfaction. Under those principles, a written offer may be contained in one or more 
documents, such as a check and separate letters. A check with the restrictive language 
described in the statute on the face of the instrument and endorsed by someone who has 
authority to settle claims is a written offer under present case law and would meet the 
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. 
The policy behind the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is to encourage the 
economical and efficient out-of-court settlement of disputes. 
Tesco has argued that its subjective intent was not to accept the $15,000 in full 
settlement of its claims. However, because Tesco's president had authority to settle 
claims and negotiated the check containing the words "payment in full for repayment on 
# 6046 per court," its subjective intentions are irrelevant. 
Third District Court Judge David S. Young correctly concluded that Utah Machine 
had fulfilled all the elements of an accord and satisfaction, which are (a) a bona-fide 
dispute over an unliquidated amount; (b) a payment tendered in full settlement of the 
entire dispute; and (c) an acceptance of a payment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PARTIES EFFECTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Tesco has tried to persuade this Court that, with the enactment of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 70A-3-607, the law of this jurisdiction governing accord and satisfaction has been 
overturned (R. 00027). 
The law of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction of this and other jurisdictions was 
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"canvassed" by the Utah Supreme Court when it decided the case of Estate Landscape 
v. Mountain States Telephone, 844 P.2d 332 (Utah 1992). In that case, the court said 
that the elements of accord and satisfaction are (i) a bona-fide dispute over an 
unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and 
(iii) an acceptance of a payment. As authority for that proposition, the court cited Marion 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985); Masonry Equipment and Supply 
v. Willco Associates, Inc., 735 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Estate Landscape, the Supreme Court stated that "the question of whether there 
was a bona-fide dispute over an unliquidated amount breaks into two elements: First, is 
there a bona-fide dispute, and, second, is the amount unliquidated." Id. at 326. 
The court cited Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d at 733; Ashton v. Skeen, 
85 Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 1935) for that proposition. Id. at 326. The 
court further went on to say that "nor must the existence of this dispute be apparent from 
the face of the check, provided that the totality of the circumstances makes clear that 
such a dispute exists over an unliquidated amount and that the creditor understood that 
the debtor was tendering the payment in satisfaction of the entire dispute." Id. at 326, 
327. (Supporting case citations omitted.) 
Tesco did not argue in the Trial Court that there was no bona-fide dispute between 
the parties. The restrictive language appeared on the check itself. Tesco's counsel 
raised certain issues in its demand letters to Utah Machine, and the issues raised in 
Tesco's First Complaint unmistakably establish a dispute over the amount due. 
Tesco did not contest the fact that the amount in dispute was unliquidated. The 
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lawsuit pending against Utah Machine raised several issues as to the amount in 
controversy. (R. 00138) The undisputed facts in this case indicate that Utah Machine's 
claim was unliquidated at the time of the tender of the check and it has therefore 
established the first element of accord and satisfaction, which requires a bona-fide dispute 
over an unliquidated amount. 
The second element of accord and satisfaction, which requires a payment tendered 
in full settlement of the entire dispute, was not contested by Tesco. The restrictive 
language on the reverse side of the check "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court" 
clearly establishes the second element of accord and satisfaction. 
The third element of accord and satisfaction is the creditor's acceptance of the 
payment. In this case, Tesco's president was personally involved with the dispute 
between the parties from the beginning. He instructed his counsel to send demand letters 
to Utah Machine in which counsel stated, "this letter shall constitute formal demand on 
you to repay the $15,000 to Tesco American, Inc. plus interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from May 27, 1992 to the date of your payment, together with $200 in attorney's 
fees, and for costs incurred in connection with asserting this demand." (R. 00063) He 
appeared in court on Tesco's Order to Show Cause Why Its Order For Pre-Judgment Writ 
of Replevin Should Not Be Continued In Effect During the Pendency of the Action and 
heard Utah Machine's offer to refund the $15,000 in settlement of the case. He signed 
an Affidavit in Opposition to Utah Machine's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 00033) 
and endorsed the check bearing the restrictive language. (R. 00098) 
Tesco has argued that its president, Mr. Brugger, "cashed the $15,000 from Utah 
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Machine with the understanding that it constituted a return of its purchase money only. 
Tesco did not intend to release Utah Machine from any claims. Tesco and Utah Machine 
did not enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to the effect that the return of the 
purchase price was an accord and satisfaction between them." (R. 00023) 
In Estate Landscape, Id. 329, 330, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue 
as to whether the creditor must subjectively assent to the accord or "whether the 
creditor's mere negotiation of a check bearing a restrictive condition suffices to discharge 
the obligation." The Utah Court of Appeals, in determining that Mountain Bell's letter to 
Estate Landscape did not constitute an accord and satisfaction held: 
This letter is entirely unilateral; and there is no indication that Estate 
Landscape assented to the letter as an accord; its signature on the check 
is not an assent to an accord not found on the face of the check as a 
restrictive endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is offered has 
expressly rejected the proposed accord, continued the dispute, and filed 
litigation to resolve it adversarily in court. 793 P.2d at 419 (Footnote 
omitted.) In essence, therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned that 
because Estate Landscape contested the accord through litigation, it must 
have "rejected" the accord proffered by Mountain Bell, we disagree. 
As Judge Jackson pointed out in dissent, the majority of the court of 
appeals misconstrued the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. As adopted 
in this jurisdiction, the doctrine does not require subjective intent to 
discharge an obligation, provided the parties' actions give rise to a 
reasonable inference that they accepted the altered performance of their 
contract. Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that 
negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check 
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent to negate 
the condition. 
Both Utah cases and authority from other jurisdictions support this 
holding. In Marton, for example, we found that a creditor's negotiation of 
a check bearing a restrictive condition constituted an accord and satisfaction 
even though the creditor had written "not full payment" beneath the 
condition before cashing the check. 706 P.2d at 608. Similarly, the Utah 
Court of Appeals found that crossing out the restrictive condition before 
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negotiating the check did not avoid an accord and satisfaction. Cove View 
Excavating & Constr., 758 P.2 at 478. 
In both cases, the creditors' conduct reveals a subjective intent not 
to accept the lower payment as full discharge of their claims. However, 
because they negotiated the checks, their subjective objections were 
irrelevant. Their options were to accept the checks on their debtors' terms 
or to refrain from negotiating the checks and seek the entire sums through 
the judicial process. (Citations omitted.) 
In Estate Landscape, the Supreme Court quoting the New York Court of Appeals, 
pointed out that "what is said is overwritten by what is done, and assent is imputed as an 
inference of law." Id. 330. 
If this case were decided on the case law in this jurisdiction presently in effect, it 
is clear that Utah Machine has established all three elements of the defense of accord 
and satisfaction. 
This case appears to be one of first impression on the issue as to what, if any, 
affect, the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 has on the existing case law. 
In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court held that "a written offer may be 
contained in one or more documents, such as a check and a separate letter." Id. 326. 
Under present case law, if the payee endorses a check with a restrictive condition, the 
check itself would be a "writing" within the meaning of the statute. 
The restrictive endorsement in this case is clearly a written offer to settle the 
dispute. William Brugger, president of Tesco, personally endorsed the check and cashed 
it, indicating his objective intent to accept the amount of the check as full payment of the 
obligation. This fact, coupled with his personal involvement in the dispute from the 
beginning, is compelling evidence that his objective intent was to accept the check on 
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Utah Machine's terms. If this Court were to decline to characterize the check containing 
the words payment in full as a written offer, the holding would be inconsistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's enunciation that a written offer may be contained in one or more 
documents. 
Tesco argued at the hearing on Utah Machine's Motion for Summary Judgment "if 
an instrument is marked 'paid in full' or 'full satisfaction,' or 'payment in full,' or whatever, 
it doesn't end the matter. It's got to be a separate written agreement of some kind, 
showing that the parties agreed that this was a mutual satisfaction of the underlying 
obligation. That is not what happened in this case." (R. 00217) 
The statute doesn't require a "separate written agreement." The Utah Supreme 
Court has already decided that a "written offer" may be contained in one or more 
documents, such as a check and a separate letter. 
The statute would address an egregious scenario under which a debtor may send 
a check with restrictive language to a lock box of an institution and a clerk or employee 
with no authority to settle claims would endorse the check and deposit it. The statute 
clearly requires that an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims must 
agree in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the 
obligation. 
However, as in this case, if an officer or employee with authority to settle claims 
endorses a check with a restrictive condition containing language such as "paid in full," 
"payment in full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, the check would 
be a "writing" within the meaning of the statute. 
- 1 2 -
It is axiomatic that, as with any contract, the parties must consent to an accord and 
satisfaction. If there was any doubt before, the statute has made it clear that only an 
officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims can give the required consent. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 has not overturned the existing case law on 
accord and satisfaction as Tesco would argue, but may have at least clarified 
unequivocally that only an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims may 
agree in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the 
obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Machine has established all three elements of the defense of accord and 
satisfaction. William Brugger, president of Tesco, had the authority to settle claims and 
agreed in writing to accept the check for $15,000 with the restrictive condition as full 
payment of the obligation. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's Entry 
of Summary Judgment in favor of Utah Machine. 
Dated this 3rd day of February, 1994. 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
SK ^ ^ - A ^ 
Ison 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
rancis J. Nie 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE to the following, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of February, 1994: 
Ellen Maycock 
David C. Wright 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Francis J. Nielson 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Utah Machine Invoice No. 6046 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 13,1993 
3. Judgment dated July 13, 1993. 
4. Utah Machine Settlement Check for $15,000 endorsed by Tesco 
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EXHIBIT 1 
t-i-f 
&£5& ^alissi Properties, Inc. 
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MAY 27, 1992 
920527E 
RICHARD LETHER 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL 
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GEKA 100-5H 5 X 5 HYDRi 
PRICE 
S/N: 12834- YEAR 1984} HAS OVERSIZE PUNCH 
ATTACHMENT FOR UP TO 4" HOLES; HAS "V" NOTCHERj 
DEPTH OF THROAT 11-3/4" TQ 11-7/8V FROM THROAT 
TO CENTER LINE} LIST OF TOOLING-••''OVERSIZE 
PUNCHING ATTACHMENT FOR DYE BLOCK AND PUNCHING 
HOLES, PRESS BRAKE ATTACHMENT FOR BENDING, 
NOTCHER GAUGE TABLE, AUTOMATIC LINK GAUGE AND 
ONE EXTENSION, SPECIAL CHANNEL BLADES FOR 
ALUMINUM EXTRUDED CHANNEL, SPECIAL MULTIPLE 
PUNCH FOR PUNCHING MORE THAN ONE HOLE AT A 
TIME. 
PRICE: FOB SHIPPIN3 *12,750.00 
TERMS: CHECK UPON RECEIPT OF INVOICE 
ADORERS WHERE GEKA IS LOCATED: 
ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION 
201 HICKMAN DRIVE 
SANFORD, FL 32/71-8201 
TEL: 407-32.3-8220 
FAX: 407-322-8934 
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EXHIBIT 2 
JUL 13 1993 
Francis J. Nielson 2411 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-0524 
45092 
kLc^u or 
IN THE TfflRD~e»€UIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
TESCO AMERICAN, INC., : 
A Utah Corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba Civil No. 930902937 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, : 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. 
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary 
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30 
a.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for 
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having 
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's 
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiffs Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of 
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having 
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be 
1 
U i . i 
Civil No. 930902937 
Judge David S. Young 
submitted to the trial court, and good cause appearing, therefore, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 27, 1992, Richard T. Lether, dba Utah Machine Tool Exchange 
(Richard) purchased certain equipment from Calissi Properties, Inc. (Calissi) for resale to the 
plaintiff, Tesco American, Inc. (Tesco). 
2. On May 27, 1992, Richard sold the equipment to Tesco for $15,000.00. 
3. Tesco paid Richard $15,000.00 for the equipment with his check number 
011338, dated May 27, 1992. 
4. Richard paid Calissi $12,750.00 for the equipment with his check number 
9533, dated May 27, 1992. 
5. Richard purchased the equipment from Calissi with the understanding it 
would be shipped upon receipt of payment in full. 
6. Calissi failed to perform as agreed in that it did not ship the equipment 
upon receipt of payment in full from Richard. 
7. Richard, through counsel and the Economic Crime Unit of the Attorney's 
General's Office of the State of Florida, pressed Calissi to perform without success. 
8. On August 21, 1992, James R. Kruse of the law firm of Kruse, Landa and 
Maycock demanded of Richard formally to repay the amount of $15,000.00 to Tesco, plus 
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interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from May 27, 1992, to the date of the 
payment, together with $200.00 in attorney's fees, and for costs incurred in connection with 
asserting the demand. 
9. James R. Kruse sent another communication to Richard on August 24, 
1992, reiterating Tesco's demand to refund the $15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
reimbursement of $622.00 in air fare for the representative of Tesco to travel to Florida to 
inspect the machine that Richard had agreed to sell to Tesco. 
10. On September 11, 1992, Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, wrote to Ellen 
Maycock suggesting a method by which the $15,000.00 could be refunded if Richard could not 
secure the machine from Calissi. 
11. On September 16, 1992, Tesco's attorney, Ellen Maycock, wrote to 
Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, outlining a method by which Richard could refund the 
$15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees, costs and air fare incurred by Tesco to inspect the 
machine. 
12. On or about September 15, 1992, Tesco filed suit against Richard. 
13. On or about October 15, 1992, Ray Ciarci of Calissi advised Richard that 
the equipment was available and Richard arranged for the machine to be shipped to Salt Lake 
City. 
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14. On or about October 27, 1992, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-judgment 
Writ of Replevin and took the equipment into its possession. 
15. On or about November 24, 1992, the court entered an order requiring 
Tesco to return the equipment to Richard. 
16. At the hearing on Tesco's Order to Show Cause why its Order for Pre-
judgment Writ of Replevin should not be continued in effect during the pendency of the action, 
Richard stated in open court that he would be willing to refund the $15,000.00 immediately. 
17. Tesco, through its counsel, Ellen Maycock, instructed Richard to deliver 
the $15,000.00 check to her office. 
18. Richard paid the $15,000.00 with his check number 9825, dated October 
30, 1992. 
19. Richard wrote "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court." 
20. Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, endorsed the check and deposited 
it. 
21. After having deposited the check with the restrictive endorsement, Tesco 
continued with its lawsuit and filed its First Amended Complaint seeking an award of 
compensatory damages of $15,000.00, for an award of incidental and consequential damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of the 
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action, and for an award of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at 
trial. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There are no genuine issues of fact relating to the defense of accord and 
satisfaction to be submitted to the trial court. 
2. The Court has reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to Tesco, the 
non-moving party. 
3. Tesco's subjective intentions reflected in its claims that it cashed the 
$15,000.00 check from Richard with the understanding that it constituted a return of its purchase 
money only, that it did not intend to release Richard from any claims and that the parties did 
not enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to the effect that the return of the purchase 
price was an accord and satisfaction between them, are irrelevant. 
4. Tesco's conduct reflected in the demand letters to Richard for 
reimbursement of the $15,000.00, the discussions in open court in which Richard agreed to 
refund the entire $15,000.00 purchase price and the endorsement of the $15,000.00 check by 
Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, is conclusive proof of acceptance of the accord and 
satisfaction by Tesco. 
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5. Richard has established the defense of accord and satisfaction by 
demonstrating that there was a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount, that a payment 
was tendered by Richard in full settlement of the entire dispute, and that Tesco accepted the 
payment. 
6. Richard is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Tesco's First Amended 
Complaint against him with prejudice. 
6. Richard is not entitled to summary judgment on his Counterclaim because 
there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether a press brake attachment was returned with the rest 
of the machine. 
DATED this / ^ day of Julv. 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 1993, I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
to the following: 
David C. Wright 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Francis J. Nielson 2411 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-0524 
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• Gmemr-cc IN THE THIRD GffieUfP-COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
TESCO AMERICAN, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba 
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930902937 
Judge David S. Young 
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary 
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30 
a.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for 
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having 
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's 
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiff's Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of 
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having 
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be 
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submitted to the trial court, and the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiffs claims 
against defendant is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint against defendant is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
3. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim 
against the plaintiff is denied. 
DATED this I b- day of July, 1993. / ^ 
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